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Abstract 
How can we overcome apathy and instigate a desire to help others? This research tests and 
compares the prosocial effects of two of the most prototypical emotions on a range of 
prosocial intentions and behaviors. Emotion-inducing videos were used to instigate states of 
moral elevation (felt when witnessing a moral virtue) and/or moral outrage (felt when 
witnessing a moral transgression). Although elevation and outrage derive from opposing 
appraisals, separate strands of research show that they both instigate a desire to help others. 
The current research tests the appraisal tendency framework to explore whether elevation and 
outrage increase prosociality across moral domains or whether their prosocial effects are 
domain specific. Results of Experiment 1 showed that elevation, but not outrage, increased 
donations to charity (i.e., benevolence domain). Experiment 2 showed that outrage, but not 
elevation, increased prosocial political action intentions (i.e., justice domain). Experiment 3 
showed that outrage, but not elevation, increased compensation in a third-party bystander 
game (i.e., justice domain). This research shows that although elevation and outrage both 
inspire a desire to help others, they affect distinct types of prosocial behaviors, offering 
support for the appraisal tendency framework. Applied and theoretical implications are 
discussed.  
Keywords: moral emotions, outrage, elevation, prosocial behavior, appraisal tendency 
framework 
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Testing the Prosocial Effectiveness of the Prototypical Moral Emotions: Elevation Increases 
Benevolent Behaviors and Outrage Increases Justice Behaviors 
High levels of poverty and inequality persist, with 22 percent of the developing 
world’s population still living in extreme poverty (The World Bank, 2012). Yet, many people 
remain as bystanders to these inequalities (Singer, 2009). This global wealth anomaly 
highlights the need for research to understand how we can mobilize people to take action to 
help others less fortunate than themselves. The current research contributes to this issue by 
testing the prosocial effects of two particularly powerful moral emotions – elevation and 
outrage (Haidt, 2003). Once their effects are better understood they could inform real-world 
interventions aimed at fostering civic action.  
Moral Emotions and Prosociality 
Moral emotions are defined as those that respond to moral violations or standards, or 
those that motivate moral behavior (Haidt, 2003). Morality has been defined in numerous 
ways, however we employ the definition of Gewirth (1984, p.978 as cited in Haidt, 2003): 
moral rules or judgments “must bear on the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or 
at least of persons other than the judge or agent”. Prosocial behaviors are those that benefit 
others or increase the welfare of others (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005).  
Increasingly, research demonstrates that moral emotions can mobilize people to help 
others (cf. Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Haidt’s (2003) model for “prototypical 
moral emotions” suggests that disinterested elicitors and action tendencies are crucial for 
understanding the prosocial effectiveness of moral emotions. Disinterested elicitors refer to 
the emotions that can be triggered even when there is no personal stake. Prosocial action 
tendencies refer to the degree to which the action tendency following the triggering event 
benefits others, or upholds the social order. Emotions high in both disinterested elicitors and 
prosocial action tendencies are prototypical moral emotions. Using these component features, 
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Haidt (2003) described moral elevation, outrage, compassion, and guilt as the most 
prototypical moral emotions. These emotions are theorized to be the most intrinsically linked 
to the welfare of others, and thus most effective in inducing selfless prosociality.  
Elevation   
Elevation is felt when witnessing another person perform a virtuous act (Algoe & 
Haidt, 2009). Elevation consists of a feeling of warmth and expansion that is accompanied by 
admiration for the person(s) who performed the exemplary behavior, and promotes a desire to 
emulate this exemplar (Haidt, 2003). Elevation may seem similar to feelings of “awe” or 
“admiration”. However, its appraisals and other components are different from those of awe 
or admiration (for in depth analyses of this see Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Keltner & Haidt, 2003). 
Evidence from (the relatively few) studies on elevation suggests that it inspires helping, and 
warrants further research. For example, participants in elevation conditions (vs. control 
conditions) are more likely to volunteer for a subsequent study and spend longer helping the 
experimenter with a tedious task (Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010). Elevation attenuates the 
negative effect of social dominance orientation on donations (Freeman, Aquino, & McFerran, 
2009), elevation is related to long-term volunteering in college students (Cox, 2010), and 
individual differences in elevation predict caring, empathy, and love toward others, as well as 
valuing benevolence (Diessner, Iyer, Smith, & Haidt, 2013).  
Outrage  
Van Doorn, Zeelenberg, and Breugelmans’ (2014) recent synthesis of research on the 
prosocial effects of anger (see also Haidt, 2003; Thomas et al., 2009) highlighted that while 
the vast majority of research conceptualizes anger as an emotion with antagonistic outcomes, 
anger can also have prosocial outcomes. Specifically, in third-party contexts there is an 
alternative response to punishing perpetrators; people can also compensate and help victims. 
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Indeed, Lotz, Okimoto, Schlosser, and Fetchenhauer (2011) showed that compensation may 
be a more typical response (vs. punishment) when witnessing third-party transgressions. 
Witnessing an injustice to another person can make people feel outraged. This feeling 
has been referred to as anger (Haidt, 2003), righteous anger (Leach, 2008), and outrage 
(Montada & Schneider, 1989; Rothschild, Landau, Molina, Branscombe, & Sullivan, 2013; 
Thomas, McGarthy, & Mavor, 2009). However, outrage should be differentiated 
conceptually from anger. Specifically, although both may be experienced similarly, outrage 
refers to anger that results from witnessing a person or group transgress a moral standard 
(usually of fairness or justice) that harms another person or group, but which does not affect 
the self (cf. Rothschild et al., 2013; Thomas et al., 2009). Fehr and Fischbacher (2004, p. 64) 
distinguished between the cheated partner (the second party) and the uninvolved observer 
(the third party). In this example, the former might experience anger, the latter outrage.  
Research shows that outrage increases a range of prosocial intentions and behaviors. 
For example, Montada and Schneider (1989) showed that, following exposure to stories of 
poverty, outrage rather than guilt or negative affect predicted prosocial intentions including 
donating money and participating in a demonstration. Thomas and McGarty (2009) found 
that in opinion-based groups, inducing an outrage norm increased commitment to the “water 
for life” campaign (e.g., attending a fundraiser). Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, and Chen (2007) found 
that outrage mediated the relationship between system justification, which has been widely 
implicated in helping behaviors, and intentions to support community programs (e.g., 
donating money, volunteering) and support for the redistribution of resources. 
Furthermore, van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, and Leach (2004) found that outrage 
towards an authority for their unfair treatment of an outgroup predicted willingness to 
participate in collective action. Similarly, Iyer, Schmader, and Lickel (2007) found that 
British people’s outrage at the American government for the occupation of Iraq predicted 
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people’s willingness to take concrete political actions (e.g., confronting those responsible for 
Iraq by signing a petition). Thus, research suggests that outrage increases a range of prosocial 
behaviors including, support to and solidarity with victims, and confrontation of perpetrators. 
The Appraisal Tendency Framework 
In order to maximize the prosocial effectiveness of elevation and outrage, it is 
essential not just to know whether they influence prosocial behaviors but also which types of 
behaviors they influence and why. Indeed, research on the appraisal tendency framework 
(ATF) suggests that distinct emotions promote specific kinds of judgments and decisions as a 
function of their unique and distinctive cognitive appraisals (cf. Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 
2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). 
The ATF draws on cognitive appraisal and functional (evolutionary) theories of 
emotion to understand how emotional experiences influence judgments and decisions (Lerner 
& Keltner, 2000). From cognitive appraisal theories of emotion, the ATF draws on the notion 
that a range of cognitive dimensions (rather than just valence) differentiates emotions from 
one another. From functional theories of emotion, the ATF draws on the notion that emotions 
trigger and coordinate effective responses (physiological, behavioral, experiential, and 
communicative), which enable a person to deal with situations, problems, or opportunities 
(Frijda, 1986; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1996). The ATF extends these theories and suggests 
that each emotion activates a cognitive predisposition to appraise situations in line with the 
central-appraisal dimensions that triggered the emotion – termed appraisal tendency. In other 
words, “appraisal tendencies are goal-directed processes through which emotions exert 
effects on judgments and choice until the emotion-eliciting problem is resolved” (Lerner & 
Keltner, 2000, p. 477).  
Lerner and Keltner (2000) first developed the ATF as a response to the unique and 
heavy focus on emotion’s valence; the majority of studies in the literature have compared the 
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effects of positive versus negative moods on judgments and decisions (e.g., Bower, 1991; 
Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Johnson & Tversky, 1983). In general these studies find 
that positive moods induce positive judgments and negative moods induce negative 
judgments. Researchers even suggested that “the only relevant aspect of emotion is their 
valence” (Elster, 1998, p.64, from Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007). However, according to 
ATF, emotions of the same valence (such as fear and anger) can exert opposing effects on 
judgments and decisions, while emotions of the opposite valence (such as anger and 
happiness) can exert similar effects (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & 
Kassam, 2015).  
Studies over the past decade have provided some initial support for the ATF. For 
example, Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein (2004) compared the effects of disgust and sadness 
on routine economic transactions. While both emotions are negative, their cognitive 
appraisals are distinctive. Sadness revolves around an appraisal theme of loss, while disgust 
revolves around an appraisal theme of being too close to an indigestible object or idea 
(Lazarus, 1991). Thus, when feeling sad people are motivated to change their circumstance, 
and when feeling disgust people are motivated to expel objects and avoid taking in anything 
new. In their study they hypothesized and found that, disgust would reduce choice prices as 
buying represents a potential source of contamination, whereas sadness would increase 
choice prices as buying offers a route to change one’s current circumstances. Furthermore 
they hypothesized and found that both disgust and sadness would reduce selling prices as, for 
disgusted people reducing selling prices would offer an opportunity to get rid of current 
objects, and for sad people it would offer an opportunity to change one’s circumstance.  
In another line of research, Iyer and colleagues (2007) showed that anger, guilt, and 
shame (all negative emotions) predicted distinct political action intentions in response to the 
American and British involvement in Iraq. Shame predicted intentions to support withdrawal 
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from Iraq, anger predicted intentions to support confrontation of those responsible, to support 
compensation to Iraq, and to support withdrawal from Iraq. Guilt did not predict any political 
action intentions. However, in a similar line of research, Pagano and Huo (2007) found that 
guilt predicted reparative actions. 
 Although the Iyer et al and Pagano and Huo studies did not measure appraisals, the 
ATF would account for these distinct emotion-intention links as follows. The appraisal theme 
surrounding anger is that a person (or group) has transgressed some sort of societal standard 
(Frijda, 1986). Thus, anger should motivate action to undo the transgression or its effects. 
The appraisal theme surrounding guilt is that a person (or their ingroup) is responsible for 
specific negative actions (Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005). Thus, guilt 
should motivate action to undo the harm caused. The appraisal theme surrounding shame is 
similar to guilt however, while guilt focuses on the behavior (“I have done a bad thing”), 
shame focuses on the person’s character (“I am a bad person”) (Niedenthal, Tangney, & 
Gavanski, 1994). Thus, shame should motivate avoidant behaviors to hide ones character.  
 The appraisal tendency framework and moral judgments. The ATF has recently 
been extended to examine and understand the influence of distinct emotions on moral 
judgments. Horberg and colleagues’ (2011) review highlights that certain emotions are 
instigated by appraisals linked to specific moral themes (e.g., Haidt & Graham, 2007; Rozin, 
Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). For example, disgust, anger, and contempt derive from the 
distinct moral appraisal themes of purity, justice, and community roles respectively (Rozin et 
al., 1999). Horberg and colleagues (2011) suggest that each emotion’s moral appraisal theme 
remains salient throughout the entire emotional state and colors subsequent moral judgments 
and behaviors by prioritizing specific sociomoral concerns (or moral domains) that are 
semantically related to the emotion’s moral appraisal theme. For example, disgust should 
influence moral judgments when purity concerns are salient, anger should influence moral 
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judgments when justice concerns are salient, and elevation should influence moral judgments 
when virtue or benevolence concerns are salient.  
Importantly, Horberg and colleagues (2011) propose domain specificity. Domain 
specificity occurs when an emotion predominantly influences moral judgments about issues 
that express the associated sociomoral concern (vs. all sociomoral concerns). For example, 
disgust should primarily influence judgments relevant to purity concerns, while anger should 
primarily influence judgments relevant to justice concerns. There is some evidence for this 
notion. For example, people who are disgust-prone (vs. people who are not) show greater 
prejudice against homosexuals, but not towards African Americans (Tapias, Glaser, Keltner, 
Vasquez, & Wickens, 2007) and are especially likely to have conservative beliefs 
surrounding gay marriage and abortion, versus issues such as affirmative action (Inbar, 
Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009). Thus, research on disgust shows that its moral appraisal theme 
(purity) appears to guide its effects on moral judgments. 
Research has not yet examined whether the ATF can explain the effects of outrage 
and elevation. It is plausible that domain specificity only or predominantly appears for 
disgust. Furthermore, the majority of research has focused on moral judgments and attitudes 
but it is unclear whether the ATF can also explain behavioral effects. The current research 
will examine whether the ATF holds for two relatively less-researched moral emotions of 
opposite valences and which can engender similar prosocial behavioral outcomes (i.e., moral 
elevation and moral outrage).  
Some prior research is consistent with the idea that outrage and elevation may have 
domain specific effects. Desteno, Petty, Rucker, Wegener, and Braverman (2004) showed 
that participants induced to feel interpersonal anger were more supportive of a tax increase 
when the appeal/message was framed in angering (mostly unfairness-relevant) terms. 
Participants induced to feel sadness were more supportive of a tax increase when the 
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appeal/message was framed in saddening terms (mostly drawing on suffering, weakness, and 
need). Furthermore, Dasgupta, DeSteno, Williams, and Hunsinger (2009) showed that 
induced disgust increased bias against homosexuals but not Arabs, whereas the reverse was 
found for induced interpersonal anger. These studies did not measure moral appraisal themes 
but they do indicate that interpersonal anger (and perhaps by implication, outrage) may 
increase justice-relevant judgments.  
Another series of studies (Siegel, Thomson, & Navarro, 2014) examined whether 
elevation and gratitude have distinct effects on prosociality. Participants induced to feel 
elevation gave more to moral charities than did those induced to feel gratitude. Those induced 
to feel gratitude gave more to amoral charities than those induced to feel elevation. The 
researchers suggested that these differences occurred because elevation should encourage 
emulation of the exemplar whereas gratitude should encourage reciprocity. These differential 
outcomes suggest that the effects of elevation on behaviors are not merely due to positive 
valence, but rather involve specific underlying appraisals. The DeSteno et al. (2004), 
Dasgupta et al. (2009), and Siegel et al. (2014) studies did not examine moral appraisal 
themes, or how moral appraisal themes relate to emotional states and subsequent judgments 
and behaviors. However, they are consistent with the idea that elevation and outrage should 
have domain specific effects on behavior.  
The Current Research 
Overview 
Lerner and Keltner (2000, p. 478) suggest that research on the ATF “should compare 
emotions that are highly differentiated in their appraisal themes on judgments/choices that 
relate to that appraisal theme”. Elevation and outrage differ substantially in terms of their 
core appraisal. From their definitions, we infer that outrage and elevation should be 
underpinned by opposing appraisals (i.e., perceived violation vs. upholding of a moral 
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standard). Moreover, while elevation and outrage derive from opposing appraisals, the 
empirical evidence to date documents convergent effects of both emotions on similar 
prosocial outcomes (e.g., charitable donations, volunteering). Thus, comparing elevation and 
outrage allows a direct test of whether the two emotions influence prosocial behaviors across 
the sociomoral domains of justice and benevolence, or whether their effects are domain 
specific (cf. Horberg et al., 2011).  
To identify, for the first time, how elevation and outrage may act in concert to affect 
the same or distinct prosocial behaviors, the current research reports three experiments testing 
the joint and independent effects of these two emotions on different types of prosocial 
behaviors. Comparing their effects in an experimental design will enable us to understand 
whether they increase helping behaviors generally (across moral domains), or whether their 
effects are more nuanced and depend on the salience of the relevant sociomoral concern 
(domain specific). Specifically, experiment 1 examines benevolence-relevant behavior in the 
form of charitable donations. Experiment 2 examines justice-relevant intentions in the form 
of prosocial political action intentions following an inequality. Experiment 3 examines 
justice-relevant behavior in the form of third-party bystander compensation and punishment 
following unfairness.  
Hypotheses 
Based on the domain-specific predictions from ATF, we hypothesize that elevation 
and outrage have domain specific effects on prosocial behaviors. Elevation should increase 
prosocial behavior most when the behavioral measure is relevant to benevolence concerns. 
Outrage should increase prosocial behavior most when the behavioral measure is relevant to 
justice concerns.  
In Experiment 1 elevation, but not outrage, should increase prosociality (donations) 
and this effect should be mediated by elevation appraisals and feelings of elevation. In 
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Experiment 2, outrage, but not elevation, should increase prosociality (prosocial political 
action intentions) and this effect should be mediated by outrage appraisals and feelings of 
outrage. In Experiment 3, outrage, but not elevation, should increase prosociality (third-party 
bystander compensation and punishment) and this effect should be mediated by outrage 
appraisals and feelings of outrage.  
Alternatively, a domain general hypothesis would hold that elevation and outrage 
should positively affect prosocial behaviors across all sociomoral domains. Thus, the 
induction of either emotion should be sufficient to increase donations (Experiment 1), 
prosocial political action intentions (Experiment 2), and third-party bystander behavior 
(Experiment 3).  
Dual exposure 
It is very common in everyday life to feel multiple emotions, whether at once or close 
together in time. Thus, extending the typical paradigms that have instigated a single 
emotional state to one in which we instigate two emotional states is an essential step for 
advancing our understanding of the processes, components, and outcomes of different 
emotional states.  
In the current research we induce elevation, outrage, both elevation and outrage (dual 
exposure), or neither, and give participants an opportunity to act prosocially in one domain 
(in different studies, justice or benevolence). Dual exposure enables us to investigate the 
flexibility or rigidity of the appraisal–behavior link. We are able to test the ATF further and 
explore what happens to behavior when two emotions with opposing appraisals are 
experienced concurrently. According to ATF, appraisals following dual exposure should 
make both justice and benevolence concerns salient. One possibility is that either concern is 
sufficient to increase prosocial behavior because people may respond flexibly, taking any 
domain-relevant behavioral opportunity that presents itself. Thus, following dual exposure, 
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prosocial behavior would be high regardless of whether the opportunity is relevant to justice 
or benevolence concerns. Alternatively, the two appraisals might interfere with one another, 
attenuating the impact of either on subsequent prosocial behavior.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and design. The initial sample consisted of 117 participants (70.94% 
female) with a mean age of 23.78 (SD = 8.01). Participants were randomly assigned to 
condition in a 2 (Elevation: viewed vs. not viewed) X 2 (Outrage: viewed vs. not viewed) 
between-participants design. Data were collected using an on-line questionnaire (via a 
platform called Qualtrics). Participants were recruited via (1) a formal university-led strategy, 
50.5% (e.g., the department’s research credits scheme); or (2) an informal social network 
strategy, 49.5% (e.g., Facebook). Recruitment strategy had no effect on the dependent 
variable (p > .500).   
Procedure. Participants viewed either one or two videos (elevation, outrage, both 
elevation and outrage, or control). When participants viewed both the elevation and outrage 
inducing videos (i.e., dual exposure condition), the videos were viewed straight after one 
another, and the order was randomized. Participants then responded to the emotion, appraisal, 
and prosocial measures.  
Data analyses were restricted to British participants in Experiments 1 and 3, and to 
American participants in Experiment 2 for two reasons. First, elevation and outrage are both 
other-oriented emotions which are elicited by events not directly related to the self 
(Englander, Haidt, & Morris, 2012; Haidt, 2003; Lotz et al., 2011). Ample research shows 
that a person’s group membership strongly influences their attitudes, feelings, and behaviors 
(Abrams & Hogg, 2010). As nationality of targets was relatively salient in the videos, we 
ensured that all targets were out-group members (Northern Ireland [all experiments], the 
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DRC and the U.S. [Experiments 1 and 3], and Zambia and the UK [Experiment 2]). Second, 
well-established research shows important cross-cultural differences in domains such as 
fairness and cooperation (cf. Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Unfortunately, 
examining the cross-cultural differences in the effects of elevation and outrage on 
prosociality is beyond the scope of this research.  To avoid any confounding effects of culture 
we restricted data analyses to British participants in Experiments 1 and 3, and to American 
participants in Experiment 2.This left a sample of 92 participants (70.70% female). 
Experimental manipulations.  
Elevation video. The Elevation-inducing video (2.14-minutes) video describes the 
story of a man (Richard Moore) who was shot between the eyes with a rubber bullet, which 
permanently blinded him at the age of 10. It shows how he was able to forgive the 
perpetrator, take a positive attitude to life, and spend his life helping others. Pilot testing 
showed that the video induced high elevation (M = 6.30, SD = 1.20) and low outrage (M = 
2.35, SD = 1.73; 9-point scale). 
Outrage video. An extract from a BBC report was employed (2.42-minutes) in which 
a journalist reports how a (wealthy) financial speculator from the U.S. bought a three million 
dollar debt that Congo owed to former Yugoslavia for power lines. The financial speculators 
increased the debt to 100 million dollars, now demanding back that amount. The journalist 
also interviewed relevant Congo locals and international volunteers to show the extent of the 
cholera epidemic and the need for this money in Congo. Pilot testing showed that the video 
induced high outrage (M = 6.85, SD = 2.28) and low elevation (M = 3.40, SD = 1.60; 9-point 
scale) 
Control video. Similarly to Schnall et al. (2010) we also employed a nature video for 
our control stimulus (2.42-minutes) – a National Geographic Channel extract on Wildebeest 
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Migration. Pilot testing showed that the video induced low levels of elevation (M = 4.33, SD 
= 1.73) and outrage (M = 1.45, SD = .76; 9-point scale). 
Measures.  
Elevation. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt: inspired, awe, 
and admiration on a 9-point scale from 1 = not at all to 9 = very much (Aquino, McFerran, & 
Laven, 2011; Freeman et al., 2009). The item “uplifted” was added as principal components 
analyses showed that it loaded well on the elevation factor (loading of .88). Cronbach’s alpha 
was .89.  
Outrage. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt: angry, 
infuriated, outraged, and contempt on a 9-point scale from 1 = not at all to 9 = very much 
(Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). Cronbach’s alpha was .88.   
Appraisals. Elevation arises from an appraisal of a moral virtue whereas outrage 
arises from an appraisal of a moral transgression (cf. Haidt, 2003). These appraisals will be 
referred to as elevation appraisals (i.e., upholding a moral standard) and outrage appraisals 
(i.e., transgressing a moral standard). A four-item scale was devised for this research (e.g., 
“To what extent is there behavior in the video clip which is well above/well below the normal 
standards of behavior?”) Cronbach alphas were .83 and .79 for the elevation and the outrage 
appraisal dimensions, respectively. Participants responded from 1 = not at all to 5 = very 
much. 
Donations. Benevolence-relevant prosocial behavior was measured according to the 
amount of prize draw money participants donated to charity (cf. Aquino et al., 2011; Freeman 
et al., 2009; McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012). All participants were entered in to a £60 
($96) prize draw. Participants could donate none, some, or the entire amount to their chosen 
charity.   
Results and Discussion 
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Table 1 shows intercorrelations among variables, as well as their means and standard 
deviations. Data were analyzed using 2 (Elevation: viewed vs. not viewed) X 2 (Outrage: 
viewed vs. not viewed) ANOVAs.  
Appraisals and emotions. There was a significant main effect of Elevation. 
Participants who viewed the elevation-inducing video scored higher on elevation appraisals, 
F (1, 88) = 39.54, p < .001, η2 =.31 (M = 3.54, SE = 0.12) and on elevation, F (1, 88) = 28.58, 
p < .001, η2 = .25 (M = 5.00, SE = 0.28) than participants who had not viewed this video 
(Mpappraisals = 2.32, SE = 0.15; Melevation = 2.68, SE = 0.33).  
There was a significant main effect of Outrage. Participants who viewed the outrage-
inducing video scored higher on outrage appraisals, F (1, 88) = 32.04, p < .001, η2 = .27 (M = 
3.53, SE = 0.15) and on outrage, F (1, 88) = 31.26, p < .001, η2 = .26 (M = 4.00, SE = 0.26) 
than participants who had not viewed this video (Mappraisals = 2.24, SE = 0.17; Moutrage = 1.85, 
SE = 0.29). 
There were significant Elevation X Outrage interactions on elevation appraisals, F (1, 
88) = 26.97, p < .001, η2 = .24 and marginally on outrage appraisals, F (1, 88) = 3.56, p 
= .063, η2 = .04. Specifically, elevation appraisals reduced in the dual condition (M = 3.06, SE 
= 0.16) relative to the elevation-only condition (M = 4.02, SE = 0.19, p < .0001). In contrast, 
outrage appraisals did not differ between the dual exposure condition (M = 3.52, SE = 0.19) 
and the outrage-only condition (M = 3.55, SE = 0.24, p = .910).  
Donations. There was only a main effect of Elevation, F (1, 88) = 4.64, p = .034, η2 
= .05. Participants who had viewed the elevation-inducing video donated more (M = £33.99, 
SE = 3.19) than those who had not viewed this video (M = £23.22, SE = 3.85). The main 
effect of Outrage, F (1, 88) = .99, p = .322, η2 = .01 and the Elevation X Outrage interaction, 
F (1, 88) = 2.82, p = .097, η2 = .03 were non-significant.  
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Mediation analyses. Sequential mediation analyses (using Hayes’ 2013 Process 
macro model 6) showed that positive appraisals and then elevation significantly and 
sequentially mediated the effect of the elevation-inducing video on donations, B = 2.40, SE = 
1.41, 95CI 0.19/5.98 1 (due to the 2 X 2 design and as we were only interested in the 
mediating role of the elevation main effect, the outrage-inducing video was entered as a 
covariate). The significant total effect of the elevation-inducing video on donations (B = 9.81, 
SE = 5.02, t = 1.96, p = .054) was reduced to non-significance in the indirect model (B = -
0.55, SE = 5.69, t = -0.10, p = .924) (Fig. 1). 
To summarize, Experiment 1 offers support for the ATF. Elevation, but not outrage, 
increased donations and this effect was sequentially mediated by elevation appraisals and 
feelings of elevation.   
Experiment 2 
Method 
 Participants and design. One hundred and eighty-two (52.20% female) participants 
with a mean age of 35.41 years (SD = 12.78) completed an on-line questionnaire. Participants 
were sampled from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk; a site for web-based data collection and 
functions through a participant compensation system. Participants were randomly assigned to 
condition in a 2 (Elevation: viewed vs. not viewed) X 2 (Outrage: viewed vs. not viewed) 
between-participants design. To avoid confounding effects of nationality, analyses were 
restricted to American participants, leaving a sample of 164 participants (51.8% female). We 
also improved upon Experiment 1 by checking that the video was novel for participants. We 
excluded data from two who reported they had seen the video previously, leaving a sample of 
162.   
Procedure. Participants viewed either one or two videos (elevation, outrage, both 
elevation and outrage, or control). When participants viewed both the elevation and outrage-
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inducing videos, the videos were viewed consecutively, and the order was counter-balanced. 
Order did not affect feelings of outrage, F (1, 36) = 0.65, p = .426, η2 = .02, or feelings of 
elevation, F (1, 36) = 0.42, p = .522, η2 = .01. Participants then responded to the appraisal, 
emotion, and prosocial measures. Participants received compensation upon completion.  
Experimental manipulations. The elevation and control videos from Experiment 1 
were employed. Because participants were from the US, a new outrage-inducing video was 
necessary to ensure that outrage rather than guilt (due to nationality) would be instigated. The 
new outrage-inducing video was a 2.58-minute video, which demonstrated how a British 
multinational company dodged taxes in Zambia, and how this affected the people in Zambia 
(a small-business owner in Zambia pays more a year in tax than the multinational company). 
Pilot testing showed that this video induced high outrage (7-point scale; M = 5.01, SD = 1.41) 
and low elevation (M = 2.90, SD = 1.05). 
 Measures. Appraisals and then emotions were measured using the same items as 
Experiment 1. Participants responded to the appraisals on a 5-point scale and to the emotions 
on a 7-point scale.  
Prosocial political action intentions. This measure was adapted from Iyer et al. 
(2007). It is considered a justice-relevant measure as it assesses responses to inequality. 
Participants were told, “Recent data from Oxfam shows that 72 million children 
worldwide are out of school and that 771 million adults worldwide are illiterate. Some 
Americans are taking action to express their opinions about what should be done to improve 
access to education worldwide”. Participants were told about three groups who support 
distinct strategies: (1) support (“one group has been formed to call for the U.S. to provide 
more support and help to improve access to education (e.g., by funding the development of 
school buildings, books, teacher’s wages, and children’s uniforms)”, (2) challenge (“other 
Americans have formed a group to identify those responsible for the lack of access to 
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education worldwide and to directly challenge them to fix the problems they have created”), 
and (3) avoidance (“other Americans have formed a group to advocate for the U.S. to not get 
involved in this issue of access to education worldwide”). Participants were asked how 
willing they would be to get involved with each group in a different ways (e.g., “join the 
group's e-mail list”, “volunteer with this group”) (see Iyer et al., 2007 for full list of items). 
Cronbach’s alphas were .92 for support and challenge items, and .97 for avoidance items. 
Participants responded from 1 (“not at all willing”) to 5 (“very willing”).   
 Behavioral engagement with prosocial group. In order to measure behavioral 
engagement participants were asked: “If you would like more information about one or more 
of the groups please indicate the group you would like information about”. Participants could 
then tick one or more of the three groups.  
Results and Discussion 
Table 2 shows the correlations among variables, as well as their means and standard 
deviations. Data were analyzed using 2 (Elevation: viewed vs. not viewed) X 2 (Outrage: 
viewed vs. not viewed) ANOVAs.  
Emotions and appraisals. There was a significant main effect of Elevation. 
Participants who had viewed the elevation-inducing video scored significantly higher on 
elevation appraisals, F (1, 158) = 115.35, p < .001, η2 = .42 (M = 4.27, SE = 0.10) and on 
elevation, F (1, 158) = 61.30, p < .001, η2 = .28 (M = 5.23, SE = 0.17), than those who had 
not viewed the elevation-inducing video (Mappraisals = 2.79, SE = 0.10; Melevation = 3.38, SE = 
0.16).  
There was also a significant main effect of Outrage. Participants who had viewed the 
outrage-inducing video scored significantly higher on outrage appraisals, F (1, 158) = 126.03, 
p < .001, η2 = .44 (M = 3.93, SE = 0.11), and on outrage, F (1, 158) = 167.06, p < .001, η2 
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= .51 (M = 5.08, SE = 0.16) than those who had not viewed the outrage-inducing video 
(Mappraisals = 2.13, SE = 0.12; Moutrage = 2.01, SE = 0.17).  
 Prosocial political action intentions. There was main effect of Outrage on support, F 
(1, 158) = 4.25, p = .041, η2 = .03 and challenge intentions, F (1, 158) = 7.46, p = .007, η2 
= .05. Participants who had viewed the outrage-inducing video were significantly more likely 
to support a group that advocated victim-focused support (M = 3.44, SE = 0.12), and 
significantly more likely to support a group that advocated perpetrator-focused challenge (M 
= 3.40, SE = 0.11), than participants who had not viewed the outrage-inducing video (Msupport 
= 3.09, SE = 0.12; Mchallenge = 2.97, SE = 0.12). There was no effect of Elevation on support, F 
(1, 158) = 0.27, p = .869, η2 < .001 or challenge intentions, F (1, 158) = 0.21, p = .651, η2 
= .001. There were also no significant interaction effects on support, F (1, 158) = 0.15, p 
= .703, η2 = .001 or challenge intentions, F (1, 158) = 1.90, p = .170, η2 = .01. Finally, there 
were no significant effects on avoidance intentions (all p’s > .250).  
 Behavioral engagement. Hierarchical loglinear analyses showed a marginally 
significant interaction between the outrage-inducing video and behavioral engagement with 
the challenge group, χ2 (1) = 3.15, p = .076, whereby of the 62 participants who had requested 
further information, 38 had viewed the outrage-inducing video (61.29%). There were no 
other two or three-way interactions between the emotion-inducing videos and behavioral 
engagement (p’s > .205).  
Mediation analyses. Sequential mediation analyses (Hayes’ 2013 Process macro 
model 6 was employed) showed that negative appraisals and then outrage significantly 
mediated the effect of the outrage-inducing video on support intentions, B = 0.37, SE = 0.10, 
95CI 0.22/0.61, on challenge intentions, B = 0.34, SE = 0.09, 95CI 0.20/0.56, and on 
behavioral engagement with the challenge group, B = 0.61, SE = 0.21, 95CI 0.30/1.14 (due to 
the 2 X 2 design and as we were only interested in the mediating role of the outrage main 
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effect, the elevation-inducing video was entered as a covariate for all three mediation 
analyses; Fig. 2). 
The significant total effect of the outrage-inducing video on support intentions (B = 
0.35, SE = 0.17, t = 2.09, p = .039) was reduced to non-significance in the indirect model (B 
= -0.25, SE = 0.23, t = -1.09, p = .277). Similarly, the significant total effect of the outrage-
inducing video on challenge intentions (B = 0.44, SE = 0.16, t = 2.79, p = .006) was reduced 
to non-significance in the indirect model (B = -0.11, SE = 0.22, t = -.53, p = .598). The 
marginal effect of the outrage-inducing video on behavioral engagement with the challenge 
group (B = 0.58, SE = 0.33, Z = 1.76, p = .079) was reduced to non-significance in the 
indirect model (B = -0.42, SE = 0.56, Z = -0.75, p = .455). 
To summarize, Experiment 2 offers support for the ATF. Outrage, but not elevation, 
increased justice-relevant prosocial intentions, and this effect was sequentially mediated by 
outrage appraisals and feelings of outrage.   
  Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 examines whether the effects of elevation and outrage extend to affect 
justice-relevant prosocial behaviors. Specifically, Experiment 3 explores participant’s 
compensation and punishment following unfair distributions in a third-party bystander game.  
Method 
Participants and design. The sample initially consisted of 109 participants (13 men, 
96 women) with a mean age of 20.04 (SD = 5.10). To avoid confounding effects of 
nationality, analyses were restricted to British participants only, leaving a sample of 78 
participants (7 male, 71 female). Participants were randomly assigned to condition in a 2 
(elevation video: presented/not presented) X 2 (outrage video: presented/not presented) 
between-participants design. Data were collected in the laboratory. Participants were 
undergraduate students who took part for course credit.  
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Procedure. Participants were invited to sign-up to a three-person laboratory study. 
Participants first watched either one or two videos (elevation, outrage, both elevation and 
outrage, or control). When participants watched both the elevation and outrage-inducing 
videos (i.e., dual exposure condition), the two videos were watched straight after one another, 
and the order was counter-balanced (order did not affect feelings of elevation, F (1, 18) = 
0.07, p = .800, η2 = .004, nor feelings of outrage, F (1, 18) = 0.45, p = .509, η2 = .03). 
Participants then responded to the appraisal and emotion measures. Then they took part in the 
third-party experimental game.  
Third-party experimental game. We employed a modified experimental game to 
measure third-party bystander compensation and punishment in response to unfairness 
(Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004; Lotz et al., 2011). Participants were told that there were three 
players (A, B, and C), however in fact they were all player C. Participants were told that 
Player A has 100 points, Player B has zero points, and Player C has 50 points. Player A can 
choose to allocate any number of points (0-50) to Player B. Player C then has the option to 
compensate Player B (any amount from 0-16 points) or punish Player C (any amount from 0-
16). Participant’s decisions were made more efficient: every reduction point assigned to 
Player A reduced Player C's number of points by 1, but reduced Player A's number of points 
by 3. Every compensation point assigned to Player B reduced Player C's total number of 
points by 1, but increased Player B's total number of points by 3 (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004; Lotz et al., 2011). 
To avoid confounding effects of anger about the unequal distribution we asked 
participants to make their choices while Player A made theirs. Thus, participants (Player C) 
indicated their compensation and reduction points for each possible distribution that Player A 
could make. Participants were told that their decisions would be binding. Furthermore, each 
point in the game was equivalent to £0.10. Participants were told that 10% of participants 
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would be selected by a lottery and would receive their amount of money based on the 
decisions made in their interaction. This prize draw approach was employed due to budgetary 
reasons. However, Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) meta-analysis shows that participant’s 
behavior in experimental games does not change dependent on whether the money 
distribution is individual or by prize draw allocation.  
Experimental manipulations. The same videos as Experiment 1 were employed. 
Two participants were excluded as they had viewed the video before. 
Measures. Prior to the behavioral measure, appraisals and then emotions were 
measured using the same measures as Experiment 1 and 2. Participants responded from 1 
(“didn't feel it at all”) to 7 (“felt it very strongly”).  
Results and Discussion 
Table 3 shows the correlations among variables, as well as their means and standard 
deviations. Data were analyzed using 2 (Elevation: viewed vs. not viewed) X 2 (Outrage: 
viewed vs. not viewed) ANOVAs.  
Emotions and appraisals. There was a significant main effect of Elevation. 
Participants who had watched the elevation-inducing video scored higher on elevation 
appraisals, F (1, 74) = 135.03, p < .001, η2 = .65 (M = 4.54, SE = 0.11) and on feelings of 
elevation, F (1, 74) = 61.81, p < .001, η2 = .46 (M = 5.65, SE = 0.16), than those who had not 
watched the elevation-inducing video (Mappraisals = 2.63, SE = 0.12; Melevation = 3.87, SE = 
0.16). 
There was a significant main effect of Outrage. Participants who had watched the 
outrage-inducing video scored higher on outrage appraisals, F (1, 74) = 50.33, p < .001, η2 
= .41 (M = 3.85, SE = 0.17), and feelings of outrage, F (1, 74) = 85.58, p < .001, η2 = .54 (M 
= 4.90, SE = 0.19) than those who had not watched the outrage-inducing video (Mappraisals = 
2.13, SE = 0.17; Moutrage = 2.42, SE = 0.19).  
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Additionally, there was a significant main effect of Outrage on feelings of elevation, 
F (1, 74) = 10.05, p = .002, η2 = .12, whereby feelings of elevation were significantly lower 
when participants had watched the outrage-inducing video. Furthermore, there was a 
significant Elevation X Outrage interaction effect on feelings of elevation, F (1, 74) = 7.08, p 
= .010, η2 = .09. Pairwise comparisons showed that feelings of elevation were significantly 
higher in the dual exposure (M = 5.59, SE = 0.22) and elevation-only conditions (M = 5.70, 
SE = 0.22) than in the control condition (M = 4.53, SE = 0.24; p < .001). Moreover, feelings 
of elevation were significantly higher in the control condition than in the outrage condition 
(M = 3.21, SE = 0.23; p < .001).  
Compensation and punishment. Mean scores were calculated for compensation and 
for punishment. Mean scores included participant’s responses following the five unequal 
distributions (i.e., assigned zero, 10, 20, 30, and 40 points to Player B).  
There was a significant Elevation X Outrage interaction on compensation, F (1, 74) = 
5.65, p = .020, η2 = .07. There were no other significant effects (p’s > .105). Pairwise 
comparisons showed that participants in the outrage-only condition compensated 
significantly more (M = 5.70, SE = 0.67) than those in the control condition (M = 3.02, SE = 
0.69, p = .007) and than those in the dual exposure condition (M = 3.62, SE = 0.66, p = .031). 
The elevation-only condition did not increase (or decrease) compensation relative to any 
other condition (M = 4.11, SE = 0.64, p’s > .250).  
Despite consistent main effects of the manipulations resulting in high correlations 
between emotions and their respective appraisals, the different patterns of interaction effects 
on elevation and on behavior meant that appraisals and emotions did not correlate with the 
behavioral outcome. This meant that we could not test for mediation.  
To summarize, effects of the elevation and outrage-inducing videos in Experiment 3 
offer further partial support for the ATF. The outrage-inducing video, but not the elevation-
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inducing video, increased outrage appraisals, feelings of outrage, and justice-relevant 
behavior.  
General Discussion  
Three experiments provided support for the domain-specificity predictions of the 
appraisal tendency framework (ATF; Horberg et al., 2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). 
Specifically, all three showed that although elevation and outrage both instigated prosocial 
responses, the two emotions derived from distinctive appraisals and had distinctive effects on 
intentions and behavior.  
Prior research indicates that the ATF can help to account for the influence of emotions 
(particularly disgust) on moral judgments (e.g., Tapias et al., 2007). The present research 
extends this substantially by selectively comparing the behavioral effects of two emotions 
(elevation and outrage) that are highly distinctive in terms of their appraisals but similar in 
terms of their action tendencies. Direct comparison of the effects of moral elevation and 
moral outrage enabled us to test whether they influence behaviors across moral domains (e.g., 
justice, benevolence), or whether their effects are specific to a single moral domain. 
Domain specificity suggests that elevation should predominantly increase 
benevolence-relevant behaviors (Experiment 1) and that outrage should predominantly 
increase justice-relevant intentions and behaviors (Experiments 2 and 3). Consistent with the 
ATF, Experiment 1 showed that in the benevolence domain, only elevation increased 
donations. Furthermore, this effect was sequentially mediated by elevation appraisals (i.e., 
upholding a moral standard) and then by feelings of elevation. Experiment 2 provided further 
support for the ATF by showing, in a justice-relevant domain, that only outrage increased 
prosocial political action intentions. These effects were sequentially mediated by outrage 
appraisals (transgressing a moral standard) and then feelings of outrage. Experiment 3 
showed, again in a justice-relevant domain, that only outrage affected prosocial behavior in a 
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third-party bystander game. In line with previous findings that outrage leads to a preference 
for compensation over punishment, outrage affected compensation but not punishment in 
Experiment 3 (cf. Lotz et al., 2011). Thus, across three experiments we showed that the 
effects of inducing elevation and outrage on prosociality are domain specific, and correspond 
to their appraisal themes.  
The results from dual exposure provided further insight into ways that these 
contrasting appraisals may combine. In Experiments 1 and 2, dual exposure did not inhibit 
the prosocial effects of the alternative emotion. This suggests flexibility in the appraisal-
behavior link, whereby both sociomoral concerns (benevolence and justice) can remain 
salient during the emotional states and can respond to whichever prosocial opportunity 
presents itself. However, in Experiment 3, dual exposure appeared to inhibit the effect of 
outrage on compensation. Specifically, compensation was reduced following dual exposure 
relative to outrage-only exposure. This may be because the experimental procedure involved 
a delay between the emotion induction phase and the behavioral measurement phase 
(participants were required to “wait” for each other as all “players” had to start the game at 
the same time). This finding raises the interesting possibility that the sociomoral concerns of 
a non-domain relevant emotion may interfere with a domain-relevant emotion after a period 
of time. We have shown this can arise when the domain is justice-related, and future research 
will be needed to explore whether similar effects occur when the domain is benevolence 
related.   
Theoretical and Applied Implications 
Past research testing the ATF has focused on understanding the effects of discrete 
emotions on distinctive action tendencies (e.g., to harm others or to help others; Iyer et al., 
2007; Lerner et al., 2004; Pagano & Huo, 2007). However, a dearth of research has tested the 
influence of emotions on moral domain specificity (e.g., benevolence, justice, or purity; 
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Tapias et al., 2007). The present research substantially extends the ATF literature by testing 
whether elevation and outrage have domain specific effects on prosocial behaviors. These 
two emotions offer a particularly effective test of the ATF because despite both having 
positive connotations for prosociality they imply distinct domain specific effects 
(benevolence vs. justice, respectively). The current experiments showed that elevation and 
outrage increased domain-specific prosocial behaviors associated with their distinct moral 
appraisal themes, thus providing clear support for the ATF.  
As well as providing insights into how emotions affect individual-level prosocial 
behaviors, the current research raises interesting new questions about how distinct emotions 
may impact upon society-level processes such as moralization. Moralization is the process by 
which moral judgments become embedded into societal value systems, often through 
emotions. Research on moralization shows some support for society-level domain specificity 
in the influence of emotions such as disgust on attitudes towards societal issues such as 
homosexuality (cf. Horberg et al., 2011). Therefore, it would be interesting to explore 
whether other emotions, in particular under-researched emotions such as elevation, can also 
instigate the moralization of societal phenomena. For example, it is plausible that, across a 
community, the presence of selfless acts may generate shared feelings of elevation that create 
new moral standards of benevolence (rather than of justice). 
The current studies offer important insights for campaigns that aim to increase 
prosocial action. Firstly, the current research provides further empirical support for the 
effectiveness of elevation and outrage at increasing prosocial behaviors. Charitable 
campaigns typically draw on sympathy and guilt to instigate action, however sympathy runs 
the risk of instigating paternalistic helping (Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Thomas et al., 2009) 
while guilt runs the risk of instigating self-focused helping (Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, 2004). 
Thus, elevation and outrage appear as powerful alternatives for motivating prosocial action.  
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Secondly, the ATF offers a theoretically sound as well as tangible and practical 
framework for practitioners to understand the effects of emotions on prosocial behaviors and 
utilize them accordingly (Horberg et al., 2011). In applying the ATF to elevation and outrage, 
the current research showed how each emotion should be used appropriately to increase 
distinctive prosocial behaviors. Put differently, different behavioral goals required different 
emotional states. Specifically, the present studies showed that moral elevation strongly 
motivates benevolent behaviors. Thus, when raising money or attracting volunteers, charities 
should show uncommon acts of kindness in their campaign content. This should instigate 
feelings of elevation, make salient the sociomoral concern of benevolence, and thus 
encourage the uptake of benevolent behaviors. Moreover, moral outrage strongly motivates 
justice behaviors. Thus, when attempting to increase third-party action or intervention in 
response to injustices or unfairnesses (e.g., through collective protest or petition signing) 
charities should show moral transgressions in their campaign content. This should instigate 
feelings of outrage, make salient the sociomoral concern of justice, and thus encourage the 
uptake of justice behaviors.  
Limitations and Caveats 
Across Experiments 1 and 2 ratings of elevation and outrage were either not 
particularly high or differed by only 2-points from the control video. Research shows that 
nature (the control stimulus) can inspire feelings of awe (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). However, it 
is unlikely that the video instigated any elevation. It is also highly doubtful that the control 
stimulus instigated feelings of outrage. Thus, it is likely that participants in the control 
condition felt as though they should report some sort of emotional response, rather than 
actually feeling any emotion. It is plausible that with even stronger elevating and outrageous 
stimuli, behavioral effects may be more pronounced. Nevertheless, the significant differences 
between the emotion-inducing videos and the control video on respective emotion ratings, 
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and the consistency of the overall empirical findings with the theoretical predictions provide 
confidence in our stimuli. Future research should examine effects of a greater range of 
elevation and outrage-inducing stimuli.  
ANOVA results across the three experiments were in line with the theoretical 
predictions, but some of the correlational data merit further comment. Whereas both types of 
appraisal directly correlated with prosociality in Experiment 1 neither type of appraisal 
correlated directly with prosociality in Experiments 2 or 3. It is plausible that participants 
who dispositionally evaluate behavior with reference to moral standards (regardless of the 
particular situation) may also donate more to charity, but it is unclear why they might not also 
engage in justice-related actions. Future research should therefore investigate whether 
particular individual differences can explain these relationships.  
In Experiment 2 feelings of elevation correlate significantly with willingness to 
engage with the support group (justice-relevant). Although this was not hypothesized, it does 
not contradict the primary hypothesis that the predominant influence over justice-relevant 
intention should be outrage. Specifically, in line with the domain-specificity hypothesis the 
relationship between outrage and justice-relevant outcomes (r = .40) is substantially larger 
than that between elevation and justice-relevant outcomes (r = .20, Z = 1.85, p (1-tailed) 
= .032).  
Furthermore, the current research focused on applying the ATF to moral elevation and 
moral outrage to understand their effects on prosocial intentions and behaviors. However, 
future research should also examine how dispositional traits (such as empathy, perspective 
taking, or political ideology) are implicated in the link between moral emotions and domain 
specific prosocial behaviors. 
Conclusion 
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The present research has examined, for the first time, whether and how elevation and 
outrage can produce prosocial responses via different appraisals. Understanding how these 
appraisals and moral emotions influence prosociality is essential for deciding whether and 
how to use them in important practical interventions such as charity campaigns, educational 
efforts, or social policy strategies. The evidence shows, for the first time, that elevation and 
outrage have distinctive prosocial effects, and suggests interesting new possibilities both for 
interventions and for future theory and research.  
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Notes 
1As appraisals were measured after emotions (due to a procedural flaw), we repeated 
our mediation analyses but reversed the order of the emotions and appraisals. Results showed 
that elevation and then positive appraisals did not mediate the effect of the elevation-inducing 
video on donations, B = 1.28, SE = 1.16, 95CI -.17/5.00. These results are in line with the 
theoretical models by which emotions are evoked by their relevant appraisals, and not the 
reverse (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). 
  
MORAL ELEVATION AND MORAL OUTRAGE                                                               38 
 
Table 1 
Experiment 1: Means, standard deviations, confidence intervals, and correlations among key 
variables 
Variable Mean (SD) 95% CI 2 3 4 5 
1.Elevationa,d 3.98 (2.37) [3.49, 4.47] -.07 .56*** -.14 .32** 
2.Outragea, d 3.11 (2.08) [2.68, 3.54]  .07 .56*** .13 
3.Elevation appraisalsb 3.02 (1.16) [2.78, 3.26]   .09 .33** 
4.Outrage appraisalsb 2.99 (1.25) [2.74, 3.25]    .23* 
5.Donationsc 29.71 (23.89) [24.76, 34.65]     
Note.  N = 92. CI = confidence interval.  
a Elevation and outrage are scored on a 9-point scale (1= not at all, 9 = very much).                                                                                                                                       
b Cognitive appraisals are scored on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very much).                                 
c Prosocial behaviour was measured according to the amount of money (from £0-60) donated 
to charity.                             
d A t-test showed that the correlation between elevation and donations versus the correlation 
between outrage and donations did not differ significantly, t (89) = -1.64, p = .104.                                                           
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  
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Table 2 
Experiment 2: Means, standard deviations, confidence intervals, and correlations among key 
variables 
Variable Mean (SD) 95% CI 2 3     4 5 6 7 
1.Elevation 4.45 (1.69) [4.19, 4.71] -.09 .67*** -.26** .20** .15 -.01 
2.Outrage 3.63 (2.14) [3.30, 3.96]  -.01 .68*** .40*** .42*** .08 
3. Elevation appraisals 3.49 (1.15) [3.31, 3.67]   -.06 .05 .10 .07 
4. Outrage appraisals 3.08 (1.35) [2.87, 3.29]    .05 .10 .07 
5. Support 3.27 (.08) [3.11, 3.44]     .72*** -.06 
6. Challenge 3.20 (.08) [3.04, 3.36]      .11 
7. Avoid 1.75 (.08) [1.60, 1.91]       
Note.  N = 162. CI = confidence interval. The emotions are scored on a 7-point scale (1= not 
at all, 7 = very much). The appraisals and political action intentions are scored on a 5-point 
scale (1= not at all, 5 = very much).  
a T-tests showed that the correlations between outrage and support (t (161) = -5.44, p < .0001) 
and outrage and challenge (t (161) = -5.52, p < .0001) were significantly different to the 
correlations between elevation and support and elevation and challenge, respectively.  
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 3 
 
Experiment 3: Means, standard deviations, confidence intervals, and correlations among key 
variables 
Variable Mean (SD) 95% CI 2 3     4 5 6 
1.Elevationa 4.45 (1.69) [4.19, 4.71] -.23* .56*** -.33** -.10 -.01 
2.Outragea 3.63 (2.14) [3.30, 3.96]  -.09 .64*** .14 .06 
3. Elevation appraisals 3.49 (1.15) [3.31, 3.67]   -.19† -.07 -.01 
4. Outrage appraisals 3.08 (1.35) [2.87, 3.29]    .02 .13 
5. Compensation 3.27 (.08) [3.11, 3.44]     .13 
6. Punishment 3.20 (.08) [3.04, 3.36]      
Note.  N = 78. CI = confidence interval. The emotions are scored on a 7-point scale (1= not at 
all, 7 = very much). The appraisals are scored on a 5-point scale (1= not at all, 5 = very 
much). Compensation and punishment ranges from zero to 16.  
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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inducing 
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Positive 
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Elevation Donations 
1.10*** .86*** 2.53* 
Figure 1. Study 1: Unstandardized B coefficients for sequential mediation analyses using 
Process macro (Hayes, 2013).  
Note: *p = .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  
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Figure 2. Study 2: Unstandardized B coefficients for sequential mediation analysis using 
Process macro (Hayes, 2013).  
Note: ***p < .001.  
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